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Abstract 
During the exploration of informal venture capital the authors of the work frequently came across with various 
definitions of such terms as informal investors and business angels. This research showed that various investigators, 
organizations and associations have different interpretation of the above-mentioned terms and, accordingly, use them 
differently. The analysis carried out during this work allows one to confirm that, in process of data collection on the 
number of informal investors and business angels and its processing, a distortion of data describing the number of 
business angels takes place in some cases. The problem is that, even if the procedure is correct but the inquiry-making 
quality is poor, a significant distortion of data is possible. In the authors’ opinion, some mistakes in detect ion of the 
number of business angels can occur due to different understanding and usage of definition of business angels, and 
incorrect methods and organization of numeric data collection. 
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Over the last years, companies which needed venture fund financing of the initial stages faced some difficulties of 
finding investors from venture capital funds; therefore, the role of  informal venture capital increased significantly 
(Sahlman, A., W., Richardson, E., 2013). At present, informal venture capital (hereinafter IVC) is one of the essential 
sources of financing new (young) cutting-edge and innovative companies (Mason, Harrison, 2013; Schertler, 
Tykvová, 2009; Mason, 2008; Gullander, Napier, 2003; Freear, Sohl, Wetzel, 2002). In their works, Mason and 
Harrison refer the activity of business angels to IVC activity (Lahti, 2008, Avdeitchikova, Landstrom, Mansson, 
2008). Various European researches show that there is a tendency in Europe to increase the number of business angels 
and business angel networks (European Commission, 2010; EBAN, European Angel Investment Overview, 2012). 
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Besides, business angel organization processes undergo some improvements. They co-operate in syndicates and 
groups to raise the investment efficiency (Mason, Botelho, Harrison, 2013). Moreover, a peculiar feature of the 
activity of business angels is that they not only provide financial support to enterprises but also actively participate in 
company’s activities (Lahti, 2008, Avdeitchikova, Landstrom, Mansson, 2008). IVS researchers show that this 
movement has a significant impact on economies around the world (Mason, Botelho, Harrison, 2013; OECD 
Publishing, 2011). That’s why researchers pay great attention to this form of financing start-up companies. In addition, 
it should be noted that in some countries there are various forms of state support of IVC (Avdeitchikova and 
Niklasson, 2009). Taking into account that the state tends to use the most effective forms of support while researchers 
study IVC condition - both of them are in need of objective quantitative and qualitative data. Thus, the significance of 
data presentation is increasing as well as its reliability. Therefore, the issues of data collection and reliability with 
respect to the number of business angels and informal investors will be examined in this article. In addition, this study 
identifies the causes of possible errors in assessing the number of business angels and informal investors. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
A number of researchers and organizations emphasize lack of quantitative IVC data and its poor quality 
(Avdeitchikova, 2012; Kraemer-Eis et.al, 2012; European Commission, 2010; Masonand R. T. Harrison, 2013; 
Prohorovs, 2014). The first issue is that different researchers and organizations use different definitions of the 
concepts of business angels and informal investors. Different definitions of these concepts subsequently lead to the 
distortion of data on business angels and informal investors.  
One of the first definitions of informal investors was given by Seymour and Wetzel, who characterize them as 
“Investors who provide risk capital other than small business investment corporation, venture capital, other 
institutional investors, and public equity markets; those with high net worth and financially sophisticated; excludes 
family, friends and debt instruments” (Seymour and Wetzel, 1981). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) specifies 
Informal Investors Rate as “Percentage of 18-64 population who has personally provided funds for a new business, 
started by someone else, in the past three years” (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Homepage, 2014). According to 
Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, informal investors consist of business angels, as well as of family members 
or friends (Evaluation of EU Member States’ Business Angel Markets and Policies Final report, 2012). OECD, along 
with business angels, refers family, friends and founders to informal investors (OECD Publishing, 2011). 
Different definitions of business angels will be examined further. Mason and Harrison give the following definition 
of business angels: “A high net worth individual, acting alone or in a formal or informal syndicate, who invests his or 
her own money directly in an unquoted business in which there is no family connection and who, after making the 
investment, generally takes an active involvement in the business, for example, as an advisor or member of the board 
of directors.”(Mason and Harrison, 2008).  
The European Trade Association for Business Angels (EBAN) gives the following definition of business angels: 
“A business angel is an individual investor (qualified as defined by some national regulations) that invests directly (or 
through their personal holding) their own money predominantly in seed or start-up companies with no family 
relationships. Business angels make their own (final) investment decisions and are financially independent, i.e. a 
possible total loss of their business angel investments will not significantly change the economic situation of their 
assets. BAs invest with a medium to long term set time-frame and are ready to provide, on top of their individual 
investment, follow-up strategic support to entrepreneurs from investment to exit. They respect a code of ethics 
including rules for confidentiality and fairness of treatment (vis-à-vis entrepreneurs and other BAs), and compliance to 
anti-laundering” (EBAN, Glossary, 2013).  
The American professor Darian M. Ibrahim gives a broader interpretation of business angels: “Angel investors are 
typically defined as wealthy individuals, ―accredited investors under the securities laws, who invest personal funds in 
high-tech start-ups. A more expansive definition also includes individuals who invest in ―lifestyle firms of a non-
technical nature founded by friends or family” (Ibrahim, 2010). 
It should be noted that business angels can be divided into visible and invisible (EBAN, European Angel 
Investment Overview, 2012). It can be assumed that significant differences in the number of invisible business angels 
can be explained by the fact that the assessment of their number is being made by using only indirect methods, which 
can give significant differences in results for a variety of reasons. 
Besides, an overestimate of the number of business angels can occur because researchers incorrectly use a 
definition informal investor or equate it with the definition business angel. As a result, quantitative data is being 
distorted and, in most cases, to the higher side. 
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Further, mistakes may arise due to problems in methods, organization, process of collection and processing of data 
on informal investors and business angels. 
For example, GEM evaluation methods are based on inquiry of physical persons. According to GEM evaluation 
methods, persons who have personally provided funds for a new business started by someone else, in the past three 
years, are related to the category Informal Investors. It should be noted that GEM inquiries do not include a minimum 
amount of investments. Thus, a wide range of persons, including family, friends and colleagues becomes Informal 
investors. Calculations made by Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services while evaluating the number of European 
business angels based on GEM data, even using a decreasing coefficient, yielded the highest results as  against other 
evaluations made by themselves, and  in comparison with evaluations of the number of business angels by other 
sources (Evaluation of EU Member States’ Business Angel Markets and Policies Final report, 2012). 
Hypothesis: depending on the used definitions of informal investors and business angels, the used methods and 
methodologies and the quality of quantitative data collection, the calculated number of business angels (primarily 




3.1. Research Goal 
 
The goal of this research is to identify the causes of potential errors in evaluating the number of business angels. 
 
3.2. Research tasks 
 
x To compare different definitions Informal investors and business angels. 
x To compare the definitions Informal investors and business angels in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Sweden 
x To compare the correlation of number of informal investors and business angels in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Sweden 
x To determine possible reasons, as a result of which significant deviations in calculations of the number of 
informal investors and business angels may occur. 
 
3.3. Methods of research 
 
The researches of scientific sources, analysis of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data, Eurostat data (The 
statistical database of the European Commission) and other organizations were taken as a methodological basis for this 
research. Monographic method, logical and constructive method, descriptive statistics method and benchmarking 
study were used in this research as well.  
3.4. Research results and discussion 
Different opinions of researchers on the groups of persons whom they consider to be informal investors can be 
seen while comparing various definitions of informal investors. Comparison of definitions of informal investors is 
given in Table 1. 
As opposed to definitions of informal investors, which are used by GEM and Centre for Strategy & Evaluation 
Services, Seymour and Wetzel exclude families and debt instruments from informal investors and that fact brings their 
definition closer to definitions of business angels. Thus, researchers who will be guided by the definition informal 
investors offered by Seymour and Wetzel may get to understand that there is no difference between definitions 
informal investors and business angels. 
The definition OECD extends criteria offered by GEM and Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services and adds 
founders to them. Since every founder may have its own investor or several investors, and there may be founders 
among responders during inquiries, as a result, the number of informal investors may be several times as large when 
using OECD as against that obtained though the usage of formulations suggested by M and Centre for Strategy & 
Evaluation Services. 
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Table 1. Comparison of definitions of informal investors 
Characteristics 
Informal Investors 
Seymour and Wetzel GEM Centre for Strategy & 
Evaluation Services 
OECD 
Who are they Investors who provide 
risk capital 
Percentage of 18-64 
population who have 
personally provided funds 
for a new business, 
started by someone else, 
in the past three years 
Business angels, as well 
as family members and 
friends 
Business angels, as well 
as family, friends and 
founders 
Relationships Apart from family, 




Including family and 
friends  
Including family, friends 
and founders  
Source: developed by the authors 
Having compared the definition of business angels offered by Darian M. Ibrahim “A more expensive definition 
also includes individuals who invest in household products-related companies of a non-technical nature founded by 
friends or family” it may be concluded that this definition of business angels coincides with that of informal investors 
offered by GEM and Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services. As a result, using the formulation of business angels 
offered by Darian M. Ibrahim (not by EBAN and the majority of authors including Mason and Harrison) in 
quantitative evaluation, the number of business angels may appear overestimated by a few times and more.  
As the authors expect, besides issues related to the variety of definitions discussed above, errors may arise due 
to issues related to collecting methods, collection organizing, collection and processing of data on informal investors 
and business angels (the results of inquiries largely depend on how they are made, how respondents understand the 
essence of the questions asked, how respondents are selected and, possibly, on several other factors). Let’s consider 
this by using specific examples. In this work, the analysis of the problems in evaluation of the number of informal 
investors will be carried out in terms of three Baltic countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and two countries of northern 
Europe: Finland and Sweden. Let’s consider data on Informal Investors Rate provided by GEM (ref. Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. GEM-issued data on Informal Investors Rate (Percentage of 18-64 population who have personally provided funds for a new business, 
started by someone else, in the past three years) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Estonia - - - - - - 8.7 
Finland 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.2 3.4 4.4 3.1 
Latvia 5.3 1.6 5 6.7 10.6 7.1 7.3 
Lithuania - - - - - 6.1 9.3 
Sweden 2.6 3.7 - - 6.6 8.7 4.3 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
 As can be seen from the Table 2, Informal Investors Rate in Latvia is higher than in Finland over a period 
from 2006 to 2012 (except for 2007), it’s also higher than in Sweden (except for 2007 and 2011). For illustration 
purposes, let’s move on from the relative data on informal investors to the number of informal investors in the 
examined countries. With reference to GEM data on Informal Investors Rate and Eurostat civil data on countries at the 
age of 18-64 (covering the period from 2006 to 2012) we will calculate the absolute values of the informal investors 
(ref. Table 3). 
Let’s compare changes of number of Informal Investors in Finland and Latvia in dynamics. This analysis 
shows that the change of number of Informal Investors in Finland seems to be more logical in comparison with Latvia. 
From 2006 to 2007 the growth of number of Informal Investors in Finland can be seen, and it coincides with the 
dynamics of Fund raising for CEE private equity (EVCA CEE, 2013). Then, from 2008 to 2009 in a period of crisis a 
decrease of number of Informal Investors is observable, while in 2010 and 2011 during crisis recovery again the 
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Table 3. Estimated number of Informal Investors (based on GEM data) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Estonia - - - - - - 73 666 
Finland 89 389 109 181 93 218 73 539 113 986 147 397 103 536 
Latvia 75 352 22 594 70 298 93 057 144 299 94 661 95 901 
Lithuania - - - - - 116 174 174 380 
Sweden 144 252 207 122 - - 378 102 501 053 248 496 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Eurostat, calculations of the authors 
 
Let’s compare changes of number of Informal Investors in Finland and Latvia in dynamics. This analysis 
shows that the change of number of Informal Investors in Finland seems to be more logical in comparison with Latvia. 
From 2006 to 2007 the growth of number of Informal Investors in Finland can be seen, and it coincides with the 
dynamics of Fund raising for CEE private equity (EVCA CEE, 2013). Then, from 2008 to 2009 in a period of crisis a 
decrease of number of Informal Investors is observable, while in 2010 and 2011 during crisis recovery again the 
number of Informal Investors is growing. A decrease of the number of Informal Investors in Finland in 2012 still 
remains obscure. 
The dynamics of changes of Informal Investors in Sweden according to tendencies coincides with a change of 
number of Informal Investors of Finland. The dynamics of the number of Latvian Informal Investors differs from that 
in Finland and looks somewhat strange. For example, in 2007 (before the crisis begun) the number of Informal 
Investors decreased by 3.3 times (down to 52 thousand) as compared to 2006. Then, from 2008 to 2010, on peak of 
crisis, the number of Informal Investors begins to grow rapidly. In 2010 the number of Latvian Informal Investors 
increases in 6.4 times (on 121 thousand) as compared to 2007 (this situation occurs against the backdrop of global 
crisis). Subsequently in 2011 again we can see the decrease of the number of Informal Investors by 1.5 times (to 50 
thousand) as compared to 2010. 
 During the period from 2006 to 2012, a sizeable fluctuation of the number of Informal Investors can be seen 
in Finland, Latvia and Sweden. A summary table 4, which reflects significant fluctuation of number of Informal 
Investors of Finland, Latvia and Sweden in a period from 2006 to 2012 is shown below. 
 
Table 4. Maximum fluctuations of the number of Informal Investors of Finland, Latvia and Sweden (in a period from 2006 to 2012) 
Country Minimum number of 
Informal Investors 
Maximum number of 
Informal Investors 
Scatter in maximum and 
minimum values of 
Informal Investors 
Tendency in change of Informal 
Investors against the backdrop of global 
crisis 
Finland 73 539 (2009) 147 397 (2011) 
 
2 times Decrease by 33% in 2009 as compared 
to 2007 
Latvia 22 594 (2007) 
 
144 299 (2010) 
 
6.4 times Increase in 2009 by 319% as compared 
to 2007  
Sweden 144 252 (2006) 
 
501 053 (2011) 
 
3.5 times No data available 
Source: calculations of the authors 
 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the number of informal investors in Latvia during the period from 2006 to 
2012 increased by 6.4 times, while within several years it changed by 319%, which makes us think of the objectivity 
of data on the number of informal investors (and, if the conclusion on the number of business angels is made on that 
basis – on the number of business angels, too). 
 Then we will compare data provided in Tables 2 and 5 to test the assumption that Informal Investors Rate and 
Gross domestic product are interconnected. 
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Table 5. Gross domestic product at market prices (GDP per capita), Euro per inhabitant from 2006 to 2012 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Estonia 10 000 12 000 12 100 10 400 10 700 12 100 13 000 
Finland 31 500 34 000 34 900 32 300 33 300 35 000 35 500 
Latvia 7 200 9 600 10 500 8 600 8 600 9 800 10 900 
Lithuania 7 400 8 900 10 100 8 400 8 900 10 200 11 000 
Sweden 35 000 36 900 36 100 31 500 37 300 40 800 42 800 
Source: Eurostat 2014 
 
As can be seen from the data presented in Table 5, GDP per capita in Latvia is lagging behind substantially 
from GDP per capita of Finland and Sweden; nevertheless, Informal Investors Rate of Latvia exceeds that of Finland 
and Sweden (ref. Table 2). The result of comparison between the Latvian per capita and Informal Investors Rate with 
that of Finland and Sweden (per unit) are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Comparison between GDP per capita and Informal Investors Rate of Latvia with that of Finland and Sweden from 2006 to 2012 
Indices 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
value 
Comparison between Latvia and Finland 
GDP per capita of  
Latvia with respect to  
GDP per capita of 
Finland 
23% 28% 30% 27% 26% 28% 31% 27% 
Informal Investors Rate 
of Latvia with respect to 
Informal Investors Rate 
of Finland 
1.96 0.48 1.79 3.05 3.12 1.61 2.35 2.05 
Comparison between Latvia and Sweden 
GDP per capita of  
Latvia with respect to  
GDP per capita of 
Sweden 
21% 26% 29% 27% 23% 24% 25% 25% 
Informal Investors Rate 
of Latvia with respect to 
Informal Investors Rate 
of Finland 




1.61 0.82 1.7 1.32 
Source: the authors’ calculations.  
 
 The calculations shown in Table 6 attest to a paradoxical situation - just like the analysis of the time history 
of Informal Investors Rate fluctuation (see Table 3). Despite the fact that the average GDP per capita of Latvia 
constituted only 27% from GDP per capita of Finland ( 3,7 times as little) within the period 2006 – 2012, the Informal 
Investors Rate of Latvia exceeds that of Finland by 2.05 times on an average. The situation looks similar if we 
compare Latvia to Sweden.  GDP per capita of Latvia constituted 25% from GDP per capita of Sweden within 2006 – 
2012 on an average, while Informal Investors Rate of Latvia exceeds Informal Investors Rate of Sweden by 1.32 times 
on an average.  
 We might assume that the unexpectedly high Informal Investors Rate of Latvia may be connected with some 
peculiar features of the countries examined. However, if we compare the Latvian data with that of Lithuania and 
Estonia and the data of Finland with that of Sweden, it appears that the above-mentioned paradoxical difference 
between Informal Investors Rate in Latvia and in Finland is connected with the data collection and processing 
methods applied by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the 
number of Informal Investors in Latvia has changed by 6.4 times within 2007 – 2009 which looks strange. 
 Since the concept “Informal Investors” embraces relatives and friends apart from business angels, the 
following assumptions may be made, possibly explaining why the  Informal Investors Rate of Latvia exceeds the 
Informal Investors Rate of Finland by 2.05 times. 
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 There is a strong probability that owners of young companies apply for financial help more frequently to their 
relatives and friends, not to business angels. Moreover, it can be assumed that relatives invest small sums. As a result, 
though investment sums turn out to be small due to the predominance of the relatives and friends’ share, they demand 
the attraction of a large number of investors. Since GEM does not specify any minimal amount of investments 
required for a person’s being qualified as Informal Investors - respondents from different countries may differently 
understand the sums that they consider to be investments. Perhaps that’s exactly why the share of Informal Investors 
in countries with a low GDP per capita is higher than that in the countries with a high low GDP per capita.   
 We might assume that the reason for a lower Informal Investors Rate in countries with a higher GDP per 
capita may be that young enterprises in Finland and Sweden have great opportunities for being supported by 
governmental agencies in order to start their business; accordingly, young companies apply to Informal Investors less 
frequently. It is also possible that there exist financial and crediting institutions crediting young business tax-free as is 
accepted in Latvia. Alternatively, State Agency for Guarantees may operate on a larger scale, which makes obtaining 
of credits easier and abates the necessity of applying to Informal Investors. That’s why the behavior of owners of 
young companies may greatly differ in different countries and may affect both the number of Informal Investors and 
the business angels share therein. If the authors’ assumptions hold true, we must agree that the business 
angels/Informal Investors ratio may differ a few times in various countries.  
 A number of investigators state the evaluated numbers of business angles based on GEM data on the number 
of Informal Investors. For example, Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services evaluates the number of business 
angels in EU27 based on the data on the Informal Investors number in eight countries (Evaluation of EU Member 
States’ Business Angel Markets and Policies Final report, 2012).  
 Therefore, the authors believe that the definition of the number of business angels based on data on the 
number of Informal Investors may lead to deviation by several times and more. To rate the accuracy of such 
calculations, let us compare the number of Informal Investors calculated under GEM methods, with the number of 
visible business angels operating in countries considered in this work (see Table 7).  
Table 7. Estimating the number of Informal Investors with respect to one visible BA in 2012 
Country  Visible Bas 
number 
Number of Informal Investors 
(GEM) 
 Informal Investors/ visible BAs ratio (showing  the number of 
Informal Investor falling on one ВА) 
Latvia 22 95 901 4 359 
Estonia 43 73 666 1 713 
Finland 450 103 536 230 
Sweden 850 248 496 292 
Lithuania 31 174 380 5 625 
Source: developed by the authors, based on: Prohorovs, 2014; GEM 2012; EBAN and authors calculation   
 
Let us consider a few examples based on the data shown in Table 7. The number of visible business angels in 
Latvia is 20 times as little as in Finland, while the number of Informal Investors in those two countries differs by 7 % 
only. To show the differences between Informal Investors/Visible BAs ratios within those five countries, we place the 
results into Table 8 (comparing between the Informal Investors/Visible Bas ratios in the countries examined).  
Table 8. Assessment of the number of Informal Investors to one visible BA ratio in 2012 
 Latvia Estonia Finland Sweden Lithuania 
Latvia 1.00 2.54 18.95 14.93 1.29 
Estonia  1.00 7.45 5.87 3.28 
Finland   1.00 1.27 24.46 
Sweden    1.00 19.26 
Lithuania     1.00 
Source: developed by the authors (based on the data of Table 7) 
 
As it can be seen from Table 8, minimal differences in Informal Investors/Visible BAs ratios are observed between 
Lithuania and Latvia (1.29 times) and between Finland and Sweden (1.27 times), while the minimum difference in the 
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ratio observed between Finland and Lithuania is 24.5 times, Sweden and Lithuania  - 19.26 times and between Latvia 
and Finland – 18.95 times.  
Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that the range of Informal Investors/Visible BAs ratios in different countries 
is very wide. 
 
4. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
There exist various definitions of the concepts of Informal Investors and Business Angels. This should be taken 
into account when investigating the number of Informal Investors and Business Angels and, especially, when counting 
the number of Business Angels based on the number of Informal Investors. 
GEM conducting investigations on the number of Informal Investors probably uses a unique methodology with 
respect to various countries. However, the findings of our research of the Informal Investors index in GEM show that 
the fluctuations of the number of Informal Investors in Latvia are very impressive (319% within two years), while the 
data proper greatly differs from that of the countries comparable to Latvia – as Estonia for example. That’s why GEM 
data on the number of Informal Investors in Latvia are doubtful.  One can assume that, at the level of specific 
countries, GEM providers and partners are facing considerable defects in methods, organization, and process of 
Informal Investors data collection. Accordingly, by using GEM data in indirect methods of BA number evaluation 
with no additional check may lead to considerable misinterpretation of results – by several times and more as is shown 
in Tables 7 and 8. Therefore, when using the data on the number of Informal Investors and Business Angels, obtained 
from different sources, investigators should assess the methods for data collection and processing wherever possible, 
in order to avoid any essential errors in quantitative evaluations. Moreover, to provide for a higher data reliability and 
adequacy, the data should be compared to analogous data from other sources; the time-split data should also be 
correlated and then compared with the analogous data from other countries. This would allow one to understand which 
data can be used and which require an additional check or should be expelled from investigations.  
In surveys conducted by GEM, on the basis of which the conclusion about the number of Informal Investors is 
made, the minimum amount of investment (required to get into the category of Informal Investors) is not specified. As 
a result, even respondents who invest minimum amounts are qualified as Informal Investors. In our view, it would be 
advisable to establish a minimum threshold for the amount of investment – to be qualified as a casual investor, - or at 
least include in the questionnaire the further question whether the sum of investment exceeds 10000 EUR for example.   
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